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The offshore wind industry is in the midst of its technology breakthrough phase, as humankind has experienced 
recently in other technology breakthroughs such as the internet and the smart phone.  Wind turbine capability is 
growing considerably every few years, and infrastructure is in rapid advancement in hopes to barely keep up.  As the 
offshore wind industry has announced the technology of a 15 MW turbine, a 525 KV HVDC subsea transmission 
cable has also made its debut, reflecting a capability to support 2 GW, more than 130 of these new turbines.   
Offshore Wind power has very positive risk benefits.  It has been in a steady decline in price possibly supporting 
economic feasibility, while also growing in potential for abundance, where it could provide as a solid improvement in 
CO2 emissions from our power grid.   However, there are negative risks that the supportive infrastructure will face.  
The coastal areas are more susceptible to Earth’s weather disasters, mainly hurricanes and tropical storms, and 
findings also suggest a higher susceptibility to solar weather caused by our sun.   
When it comes to addressing these risks and assuring a reliable, resilient power source to the public, there are 
politics involved.  Offshore Wind Energy is new to the energy mix of the United States. As a result, it may face 
challenges if policy does not maintain an accurate evaluation of these risks into policy. 
This study investigates how Offshore Wind Energy in the North Atlantic offshore region of the United States will be 
affected by recent policy mitigating geomagnetic storm impacts, by analyzing its resiliency to the risk within 
thresholds presented to and enacted by congress.   Findings suggest that future Offshore Wind Energy farms and 
grid resiliency efforts will benefit from early planning and collaboration efforts, especially in the use of larger cable 
sizes and HVDC power infrastructure.  Conclusive results also suggest key future partnering opportunities in policy to 
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The power grid structure of the United States is very complex, because of dynamic challenges, as well as 
high standards for electricity.  In the relatively recent years, the United States' energized power grid 
market has had a drastic change in competition, preventing increase in consumer prices and providing 
energy security independence in the first time since the world war.  This market change was a direct 
result of new technology, obtained by the long-standing natural gas industry, just as experts awaited 
market failures as a result of oil production impacts.  (Yergin, 2020) 
In this study we are exploring how the potential of Offshore Wind Energy in the Mid and North Atlantic, 
and how new installations might be affected by policies regarding risks from natural solar weather 
events.   
In recent years, the offshore wind industry has stood out as one of the most promising renewable 
energy solutions worldwide.  In the United States power market, an extraordinary potential exists off 
the East Coast. Especially in the North Atlantic region, the market has been in recent competition 
between coal and natural gas.  The new source of energy in this region could have significant impacts on 
the reduction of CO2 emissions and provide the United States, and the world, a very big step towards 
positive climate change mitigation. 
If transmission solutions for Offshore Wind collaborate and build out a larger, more robust HVDC grid 
network to mitigate risk for solar weather events, there are potential bipartisan relationships where 
resiliency solutions will be created for human-related threats identified in importance by both political 




The new energy market 
 
In the early 2000s, an individual persistently pursued a notion that oil, and natural gas molecules could 
fit through pores in rock formed from the intensive drilling process.  After verifying size comparison in 
old boring logs in the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas, he was able to partner up with the recent advancements 
of the horizontal directional drilling (HDD) technology to establish a new hydraulic fracturing process to 
access natural gas.  (Yergin, 2020)   
This new process resulted in substantial increase in quantity.  A single company now measuring quantity 
in trillion cubic feet (TCF), where up to then would be in billion cubic feet (BCF).  In 2012, the first HDD 
well in the Permian shale region of Texas was drilled.  By 2014, Permian output raised to 2 million 





Natural Gas regulation on emission led to innovation, despite the vast reservoir of natural gas.  The 
power sector developed further processes in the combustion process to improve efficiency, channeling 
the output that would further global warming impact back in to the cycle to produce more power.  The 
efficiency improved capacity factor, output and furthered the gap of competition in the energy market 
in favor of natural gas.  Coal, nuclear and even other renewables could not compete.   
The HDD industry found a way to bring fuel closer to the consumer, by pipeline.  Natural Gas could place 
moderately sized power plants closer into communities, where other sources, such as coal, could not.  
This was clear as the new administration in 2016 tried to sway the market in favor of coal, where 
according to reports, having spent more than $1 billion dollar of taxpayer funds into the industry.  As 
one source puts it, “Trump Didn’t Save Coal or Steel. To Be Fair, No One Could” capturing more than a 
30% decline over only four years.  (Nocera, 2020) 
Had the power system transmission losses over the vast distance between coal and the consumer been 
less, some of this market offset impact would have been improved.  Transmission experts are 
considering these losses as they suggest a new means of energy transmission for future types of energy.   
Another route in this new energy market was established as the natural gas industry wielded its new 
technology and processes, taking control of the competitive market.  The prior administration during 
this era released a “vision to cut carbon pollution and transition our country to a clean-energy economy” 
but invested in to planning efforts in collaboration instead of challenging the natural gas industry, by 
“Establishing a White House Interagency Working Group on Offshore Wind”.  (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2015)     
The collaboration efforts evidently seem to reflect they will pay off in the near future energy mix. The 
offshore wind energy yields capabilities and new technology solutions that are presenting cost-effective 
access to vast quantities of power and lower costs.  The potential of this energy source has benefits to 
solve existing issues and provide for a new market competitor, but the challenge of transmission still 
exists.  
 
Offshore Wind as a competitive source 
 
As the natural gas industry was emerging from their new technology and processes, another event 
occurred, causing a substantial impact on the future energy market.  In 2010, BP’s Deepwater Horizon 
Oil spill recorded the largest accidental oil spill in history.  This devastating event led to the creation of 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and $65 billion in compensation on the impacted public, 
primarily US residents in the gulf.  (BOEM, 2020)  The role BOEM was assigned would also be responsible 
for the allocation of “blocks” or leasing areas where offshore wind farms could co-exist amongst the 
many stakeholders using the resources of ocean territory of the United States and its states.       
Clashing between politics and powerful market players invested in the oil industry led to a substantial 
overlap between politics and market strategy, by means of donors and think tanks.  From one of these 
think tanks emerged an economist who presented an opposition to wind as a competitive source.  In 
2014, John Lesser on behalf of the Heritage Foundation, called for congress to eliminate subsidies for 





improve resiliency and recovery of the power grid.  (Lesser, 2014)  This economist demanded that the 
government reduce policies for environmental standards, build communication silos and then tell the 
utility transmission owners and operators to identify their own risks.  “Congress should eliminate these 
subsidies and implement market-based reforms that will truly improve the electricity grid’s efficacy and 
resiliency.” (Lesser, 2014)    
This political motivation was in direct conflict with the collaboration efforts of the administration, 
naming “working groups” designed to “focus on sharing lessons learned, discussing regulatory 
approaches and best practices, and exchanging scientific and environmental information”.  (Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2015)  .  Lesser’s argument suggesting elimination of communication plan strategies 
targeted FERC 1000, a mandatory collaboration requirement amongst stakeholders.     
However, Lesser also captures the importance that such communication needs to take place.  He states, 
“rather than implementing one-size-fits-all federal standards, utilities and transmission system 
operators should be able to work together to identify risks and appropriate strategies to address those 
risks”  (Lesser, 2014), suggesting that the “market-based approach” requires less government 
involvement.  By pushing back on agencies, these think tanks and donor controlling mechanisms 
successfully influenced a mindset that considered a line in the sand between wind energy and its 
potential as a competitive market source.   
The wind industry grew considerably as a renewable energy, but still minimal in relation to natural gas.  
However, similar to the rise of the natural gas industry, wind has been rapidly advancing in its 
technology and construction processes, addressing issues with more efficient solutions.  Issues such as 
the NIMBY phenonium, migratory bird impact, and land availability have pushed wind power solutions 
capable further offshore and larger in size.  These improvements are drastically increasing supply and 
lowering the capacity factor, which, without a cost associated with fuel, is lowering consumer cost.     
 
The Wind Outlook 2019 evidently captured the sensitivity to free-market based approach, highlighting 
worldwide “zero-subsidy tenders” being awarded.  The report does not leave solutions to debt financing 
solutions, however noting that “commercial banks are now more comfortable with offshore wind 
projects”.  The cost of equity has evolved as well, “with lower perceived risks from investing in offshore 
wind assets being underpinned by supportive policies” which “has led to some recent auctions being 
able to take place without any government subsidies”.  (IEA, 2019) 
 
Policies along the way did help, and Offshore Wind will enter the market as a competitive source, as 
long as it overcomes other hurdles, physical and political.  The IEA report states, “Innovation is 
delivering deep cost reductions in offshore wind, and transmission costs will become increasingly 
important”, suggesting that “direct current technologies” or HVDC will have an important role.  (IEA, 
2019)   
 
The Potential of Offshore Wind Energy 
 
In recent years, the US offshore wind industry has been able to capitalize on innovation which has come 
from investments in the US as well as around the world, especially Europe.  The recent “Offshore Wind 
Outlook 2019” outlines in detail how the energy source has the potential to meet global energy 





business, by 2039.  Of that potential, a technical potential of 46,000 TWh per year lies in the United 
States territory, of which only about 25% or 11 TWh per year are in the continental United States 
(conus).  (IEA, 2019) 
The outlook states that the US shallow waters have the potential to support 3,300 TWh, but in deeper 
water another 8,700 TWh exists, noting that some is located near major cities Washington DC, Boston 
and New York.  This potential is the target area we are exploring in this study.   
New advancements, such as floating 
offshore wind platforms, have the 
potential to reach depths greater than 
60 meters, or roughly 200 feet deep.   
Figure 1 reflects the water distance, 
and depth, to offshore wind projects 
captured in the IEA report.  (IEA, 
2019)   
From this, we see that most of the 
installations exist within 50 KM, but 
there are several projects permitted 
for far reaches up to 200 KM, or 124 
miles, to shore.   
 
 
Offshore Wind Infrastructure:  HVAC or HVDC? 
 
The US department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability states “HVDC is a key 
technology in overcoming problems with renewable generation like wind, solar and hydro – that these 
resources are seldom located near the population centers that need them”.  (US Department of Energy, 
2017)  However, the existing US power grid is almost exclusively an HVAC network.  To understand why 
that is, we must go back to the early “planning effort” between the original market competitors 
originating in the 1880s.   This early evolution of the energy market is often referred to as the “War of 
the Currents”.    
Innovations by either Nikola Tesla or Thomas Edison could have shaped the power grid as we know it 
today.  As the history states, neither inventor truly won, as Nikola Tesla sold his patent on alternating 
current induction motors to Westinghouse who built their empire with the United States power 
infrastructure based on the HVAC model.  (Nix, 2019)  If Nikola Tesla had the semiconductor technology 
we have today, perhaps the grid would be HVDC and serving another path which many experts identify 
as a more effective solution for the US grid as we know it.  But even if the stepping technology were 
available, early grid competition would have had to yield to a planning effort with the consideration of 
other competitors and consumers over longer distances, an unlikely feat in the early unestablished 
energy market.  





As a generator, the wind turbine produces AC currents, so if it were not for the longer distances needed 
to reach the grid an AC solution would be more effective.  However, since the offshore wind farms are 
inherently so far from grid tie-in points, the vast distance exploits the advantage that HVDC has in power 
line loss per length.  Although natural wind is “free”, the reduction of these losses still allows a higher 
percentage of the generation to reach its target and therefore making better use of initial investment, 
aka up-front costs, of each development project.  This along with all the other percentage-based impacts 
on the delivery of power generation from the turbine is called a capacity factor, a measure used to level 
out the competition over grid usage with other power sources.   
Other power sources on our grid are generally AC power generation, just as the wind turbine, however 
usually with additional steps, or processes, along the way.  Combustion type generation, such as natural 
gas, nuclear or diesel generators, all require a phased cycle approach effort to create electricity, 
including a combustion process, a power generator and means of cooling.  The fuel required for 
combustion requires fuel, often associated with transportation, mining and/or drilling and the cooling 
requires a significant heat exchange, which is often handled by water.  Utilization of these 
inputs/outputs for the additional processes has had a negative effect on global temperatures, creating 
long controversy in their “fair use” in a fair competitive market.  Access to the natural resources is 
another factor, often continuing the effect on global temperature, while also establishing a variable 
production cost.   
Management of Risk to the Power Grid 
 
Risk and resilience are sometimes bundled together in error as a common challenge but are very 
different.  Risk, a management category, can consist of positive or negative risks, which are measured.  
Resilience is the ability to return to a normal condition after being compromised by an actual event.  
Design for resiliency would assume that an event will ultimately exist, providing the mitigation strategy. 
When it comes to Wind Energy, there are many challenges, or risks, such as land availability, 
intermittency and policies set to prevent impacts to birds or plane routes.  A study in 2014 captured 
early on how offshore wind energy has the potential to overcome these challenges, but would face a 
new, greater challenge: “the transmission of large amounts of energy over long distances”.  (Raymundo 
Enrique Torres Olguin, 2014)   
In terms of Offshore Wind Energy and its supportive infrastructure, resiliency to solar weather is highly 
dependent on the size of the solar storm we plan to address.  As the transmission increases in distance, 
the impact from any solar storm will increase, as the impact is measured by a voltage per unit length.  To 
be resilient to each event, the power system must overcome the charge impact and return to its original 
operational state, as soon as possible – if not immediately.  
Furthermore, as the solar storm increases in size and intensity, the probability decreases; no different 
than the risk associated with a hurricane.  Regardless, to be resilient would consider the event of the 
worst-case scenario storm event possible, which will require an understanding of what a Coronal Mass 






The Risk associated with Solar Weather 
 
 Recent science and technology advancements, particularly by satellites, have drastically improved our 
understanding of the sun-earth interaction and the changing climate that the world population is 
experiencing.  One part of this interaction is in 
solar weather, and what risk may exist from its 
impact on to Earth.    
NOAA presents one consideration of “Space 
Weather Impacts on Climate”, suggesting that 
cosmic rays from the sun could possibly be 
seeding cloud formations and creating cloudier 
conditions, but should not be taken out of 
context regarding its comparable effect to 
influence from the industrial period.  ((NOAA) 
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMINISTRATION, n.d.)  However, it recent 
years it has become quite evident that climate 
change and solar weather impact are two 
entirely separate risks due to the level of 
magnitude of the threat of rising global 
temperatures since the 1960s, as reflected in figure 2, from the NASA website, on their website “What’s 
the sun’s role in Climate Change”.  (NASA, 2019)   Another source from the agency, NASA Global Climate 
Change, addresses potential confusion clearly in the following statement: 
“The amount of solar energy that Earth receives has followed the Sun’s natural 11-year cycle of small 
ups and downs with no net increase since the 1950s. Over the same period, global temperature has 
risen markedly. It is therefore extremely unlikely that the Sun has caused the observed global 
temperature warming trend over the past half-century.”  (NASA Global Climate Change, 2020) 
As NASA and NOAA continue to closely monitor the sun-earth relationship, they have recovered data 
reflective of another risk caused by a solar weather event on the sun, which is called “Coronal Mass 
Ejection” (CME).   These CMEs are caused by an explosion of energy from the sun, which may be 
frequent based on where the sun is in its own solar cycles.  The risk caused by these CMEs has a very low 
probability of impact, however, if not mitigated the impact has the potential for extraordinary 
devastation to our nation’s power grid.   
Generally, the Earth’s magnetic field and atmosphere provide protection from the solar wind.  However, 
the magnetic structure of a large CME can interact with the Earth’s magnetic field in a way that allows 
charged particles to bombard the atmosphere while also rapidly altering the geomagnetic field in a way 
that significantly impacts human life.  
Before modern infrastructure existed, humans would have only considered a GMD for its natural beauty 
in the form of an aurora, as there were no long cables to accept the magnetic charge induced through 
the coupling of the charged atmosphere and Earth.  The first major CME to occur after human 
infrastructure existed is known as “The Carrington Event”, which happened in 1859, over 20 years 





before electrification.  The CME brought havoc on to the nation’s telegraph system, by energizing the 
thin communication wires which were no match for the induced power from the sun’s electron burst. 
Had such an event from the sun occurred more recently, the impacts would have been devastating.  
Although the power cables used for transmission are much larger than the telegraph wires, the network 
has grown to span great distances and in the United States, is often near or at capacity.  Major charging 
of our power infrastructure is a notable threat, and in 2012, a near miss obtained the attention of 
politicians. 
Policy Regarding Geomagnetic Storms 
 
In 2015 the TPS-007 mandate, was ordered to address the GMD threat by means of a mandated 
collaboration effort, in a phased plan.  TPL-007-1 specifically to identify the risk, establish benchmarks, 
establish a mitigation plan, and deploy.  This collaboration effort put scientists together with 
transmission operators and agencies, such as FERC, to deploy rules necessary to protect the public.  
(Frank Koza, 2017) 
However, in order 830-A in 2017, FERC standard TPL-007-1, consisted of disputes and overlooked 
objections, which suggests that such communication efforts originally planned for were not effective. 
Political oppositions argued that FERC releases undermined the appropriate risk level that is appropriate 
for a mitigation standard.  (Thomas Popik, 2017)  The report stated:   
“In the analogous case of Standard TPL-007-1, if the Benchmark GMD Event were to be set at the 
maximum threat level that had been estimated by the respected space weather scientists 
previously engaged in the NERC standard-setting process (30-40 volts/kilometer), many 
transformers might need hardware protection. Instead, the NERC Standard Drafting Team, 
consisting all of industry representatives except for one scientist, downwardly averaged the 
Benchmark GMD Event to 8 volts/kilometer. And instead of using maximum readings of 
geomagnetic disturbances recorded in the United States, the NERC standard-setting team 
opted to use averaged data from Northern Europe over a limited time period lacking any major 
solar storms.”  (Thomas Popik, 2017) 
Through the mandated collaboration effort of TPL-007, additional phases were established to provide 
guidance documents.   
The TPL-007-1 standard identified that having backup transformers across the grid was an essential 
resolution strategy to GMD impacts.  This strategy reflects that grid owners will accept the risk, 
assuming it will occur, rather than mitigate the risk by investment into the infrastructure capacity issues.  
The fact that solutions came to this conclusion speaks to the quality of the state of the infrastructure of 
our nation’s power grid.  Having a redundant backup transformer will come at a high up-front cost, likely 
unrecoverable as sunk investment, and will also require routine maintenance to assure it is functional in 
the event it must be installed.  The LIFT Act, a proposal not ratified, considered continuance of funding 
to address resiliency solutions for the grid, noting both solar weather and the lesser EMP as potential 
threats.  Its focus was to be towards the transformer replacement program determined in the standard, 





While the LIFT Act remained unaddressed, the “Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to 
Electromagnetic Pulses” was executed on March 26, 2019.  This order was directed at Electromagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) or High-altitude EMP (HEMP) attacks from nuclear detonations in the atmosphere, noted as 
“approximately 40 kilometers or more above the surface”, which would require an attack from another 
nation.  The order compares the threat of an EMP as an equal counterpart to a natural GMD from solar 
weather events, claiming that “both HEMPs and GMDs can affect large geographic areas”.  (Executive 
Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses, 2019)   
The comparison between HEMPs and GMDs within the same scale is considerably inaccurate, as a HEMP 
would be limited to a metropolitan area, where a GMD originates in the North Pole and generally 
engulfs entire sections of the planet.  For example, the Carrington Event was reported to have stretched 
from the North Pole all the way to Venezuela, making this a global threat.  The executive order misleads 
mitigation requirements by only acknowledging the requirement to addressing the EMP risk, setting 
aside GMD, which limits solutions which would provide for offshore wind infrastructure which would 
not fall within the threat area of an EMP.  Some experts point out that if a nuclear detonation at these 
altitudes were large enough to be a nationwide threat, the risk associated with the nuclear blast would 
far outweigh the effects from geomagnetic disturbances.  Nevertheless, the risk is identified, and this 
study captures both in the consideration of the larger GMD risk.  
The LIFT act was not limited to the need for the power infrastructure to address solar weather events or 
geomagnetic disturbances, it also addressed climate-related risks as well.   It also included proposals to 
address global warming mitigation.  The basis behind the LIFT Act is a dire need “to rebuild and 
modernize” the US power infrastructure, which has been a bi-partisan concern.  Ironically, when it 
comes to these threats, some are a result of human activity, such as EMPs, some are purely natural 
events, such as solar weather events, and in the case of climate-related events, a result of a combination 
of both human and natural changes. 
 
Power Grid Resiliency 
 
Physical challenges will increase as the distance from the shore increases to capture the greater 
potential of offshore wind power available, as previously mentioned from the Offshore Wind Outlook 
report.  We captured previously that solar weather events will increase linearly, as the impact is 
measured in voltage per unit length, but this should also be known to be a physical constraint on top of 
another key issue – which is the voltage drop per length, which is not quite as linear.  To capture the 
amplified impact within this analysis, I use the findings from a 2019 report, “Comparative Study of HVAC 
and HVDC Transmission Systems, With Proposed Machine Learning Algorithms for Fault Location 
Detection”.   
The report by Bassam Albannai provides data for the losses and voltage drop over extended lengths, as a 
percentage of the flow.  As defined in the study, “voltage drop is the amount of electricity wasted due to 
the resistance of the transmission line”.  (Albannai, 2019)    To account for the variability for those losses 
in the analysis, we utilized Albannai’s data reflective of a ‘typical’ loss per cable. Albannai plots his data 





Figure 3:  Visualization of Data Points 
 
“Comparative study of HVAC and HVDC transmission systems” by Kalair et al, identifies a comparison to 
HVDC and HVAC, which has findings that reflect that HVAC would require 2:1 cables to carry the same 
capacity in MW.  The study states “A 66 kV 5 km long 3-phase AC line has the 87 MW power transfer 
capability, whereas a 66 kV 5 km DC line can handle up to 167.6 MW which is 1.925 times more than an 
equivalent AC line”.  It references an “equivalent” HVAC transmission cable system to the HVDC line 
consisting of an additional set of wires, as part of goal to fit inside of a common ROW (Right-of-Way).  
(A. Kalair, 2016) 
The comparative analysis by Kalair, et all provides very well for land based transmission, however 
beyond the coastline of the US, the ROW would be less relevant, and the numbers of cables would 
increase the impact from a solar storm event considerably.  For each additional wire, the HVAC system 
“equivalent” would double in impact.   
Kalair et al explains that “In a typical HVDC system, the AC power is taken from AC network, converted 
into DC by a converter station and transmitted to remote point by an overhead line on land or 
submarine cable in sea”.   (A. Kalair, 2016)   The is an overall explanation for the disadvantages to HVDC, 
for the purpose of this analysis are captured at a “break-even” distance of approximately 50 kilometers, 
where the costs associated with the additional equipment to convert for DC transport zero out with the 
savings per unit run.  For the purposes of this analysis, all the subject location wind farms are beyond 50 
kilometers, considering the assumption that from that point the other features are negated. 
In investigating typical configurations, we find that HVDC systems also tend to install several wires to 
transport power, generally for redundancy. (ABB, 2006) This study assumes the same redundancy would 
not apply to the HVAC, and therefore assumes a single HVDC wire will be utilized.   
The analysis in this study breaks down these multi-wire systems based on these assumptions, calculating 
3:1 wire ratio for 33kV to 200kV power networks and excluding HVAC for power subsea cables for 400 
kV and 525 kV networks, where the systems would require too many wires to be feasible in resistance to 
GMD.  Where the power lines would be subject to permanent damage in the event of a solar weather 
event, TPL-007 would require a backup transformer.  Here, we assume a backup transformer is not a 





The risks from natural atmospheric weather will be substantial to the offshore wind market but may be 
avoided with longer HVDC transmission runs capable of tie into multiple network points on the grid.  The 
risks from geomagnetic storm disturbances will grow, however, the risk from EMP threats will decrease.   
Many experts have exposed a critical opportunity for offshore wind industry, in how it will benefit from 
the advantageous use of HVDC, where traditional HVAC transmission has dominated the grid, because of 
it is length.  To this point, the HVDC transmission solution could potentially reach vast lengths across the 
country, connecting different regions as they face different natural disasters caused by climate change.  
However, vulnerability to geomagnetic disturbance, as well as EMP often is omitted from planning 
efforts because it has been relatively silent in politics until very recently, when a “near miss” occurred in 
2012.   
With our modern infrastructure, the 2012 near miss would have caused trillions of dollars and 
potentially left many of the United States without power (NASA, 2014) as the population scrambled to 
build long-lead transformers to replace those that would have inevitably fallen to the power surge of 
over 20V per linear kilometer of transmission line.  Lower latitudes and independent grids, such as 
distributed renewable systems and all of Texas, would have likely avoided the catastrophic impact.  
However, much of the United States power grid would have suffered impacts that would affect major 
essential parts of our society even beyond the average consumer, such as hospitals and national 
security.  Although the probability of an extremely large CME directly hitting the Earth is very low, that 
fact is that “we need to be prepared” as explained by NASA scientist in response to the near miss in 
2012 (NASA, 2014). Ironically, only those with solar roofs or wind turbines, along with substantial 
battery packs, would have avoided a trip back to a time without electrification. 
By investigating long lengths potentially necessary for the offshore wind industry, partial resilience to 
hurricane events can also be assessed.  While longer transmission runs are a hinderance for resiliency to 
solar storm events, it’s impact to hurricane resilience is inversely affected.  The longer a transmission 
run can travel West into the continental US, the lower the probability its tie-in point will be subjected to 
devastation from the regional storm events.  Although the hurricane events are also rare, there are 
trends suggesting our future is to expect a high frequency as global temperatures rise.   
Methods. 
 
The study investigates Offshore Wind farms in the farthest reaches of the OCS, to best consider limiting 
factors of the future potential of the new technology.  It first investigates two types of transmission 
distribution, HVAC and HVDC, in their resiliency against the risk of solar weather associated with length 
of runs.  As a second part, the study will analyze the resilience potential to geographically avoid regional 
climate-related impacts based on the distance of the grid tie-in point.   
 
Data & Assumptions 
 
By analyzing the risk to transmission networks of offshore wind energy associated with solar weather, 





weather events.  The primary objective in this study assesses resiliency to geomagnetic disturbances, 
which as mentioned previously, may be of various levels of severity and various types, which will be 
defined.   
Also mentioned previously, the risk associated with solar weather will be inversely affected by risks 
associated with regional climate-related impacts: hurricanes, tropical storms, cyclones, and sea level 
rise.  These risks will not be considered on the production side, where the wind farm would be 
potentially located. Modern technology advancements of the offshore wind turbines are overcoming 
resiliency issues associated with heavy storms, for example, turbine blades having “feathering” and 
“breaking” capabilities to adjust for excessive wind force. 
Instead, vulnerability to these risks is analyzed at the grid tie-in point side, which could be at one or 
more locations.  To perform the analysis, engineering and design considerations regarding the network 
configuration are necessary to understand what technical aspects of transmission grid tie-in points are 




The risk associated with GMD has established its physical impact on unit length of cable installed and 
grid connection tie-in point along latitudinal lines of the Earth.   
This study defines transmission configuration as the design factors applicable to the high-level planning 
process, specifically addressing length of cable and grid tie-in point.  Engineering offshore wind farm 
transmission solutions is a complex process, yet without the challenges that are expected to be faced in 
the future as land blocks are used up.  In a future energy mix that is utilizing a large portion of the 
potential of offshore wind energy along the East Coast of the United States it is expected that wind 
farms will push further out, increasing distance, and also compete with limited tie-in points along the 
shoreline.  Amongst the most important elements of the high-level planning process is to collaborate 
cooperatively and build out a system planned for this future.  (Brandon Burke, 2020) 
The communication plan strategy for future planning considers policy and government agencies as 
discussed previously and is briefly discussed to identify assumptions associated with the risk assessed in 
this study.  Furthermore, technical design factors include assumptions for the grid tie-in connection 
strategy, the number of cables along the latitudinal length and the current type (HVAC or HVDC) 
described previously.    
 
Communication Planning, Collaboration & Partnering 
 
This study utilized information provided by “Offshore Wind Transmission White Paper”, as authored by 
Brandon Burke et all, which is a publishing by the Business Network for Offshore Wind.  The Business 
Network for Offshore Wind identifies themselves as a non-profit “dedicated to building a network that 





The members of the offshore business network found that transmission coordination efforts have been 
reactive to transmission requests, where better planning efforts would consider the future needs.  FERC 
1000 requires that meetings amongst the transmission stakeholders will take place to tackle such 
coordination efforts.  The paper suggests that the DOE and FERC could also partner up to solve this area 
by playing “a critical convening role with stakeholders across states and RTOs”.  (Brandon Burke, 2020, 
p. 39) 
Such a coordination effort would be challenged with the task of crossing state lines but may find 
opportunity in addressing a “common enemy” in extreme risks resulting from solar weather activity, 
hurricanes, or other natural disasters subject to more potential frequency as a result of climate change.  
The basis of this study explores the most extreme risks that may be either a hurdle to overcome or a 
solution to address, depending on how far the transmission reach. 
 
Offshore Grid Connections. 
 
This paper demonstrates two primary core solutions for the means in which Offshore Wind Energy may 
tie into the grid.  These configurations are essential to understand when associating length of cable  
The first is a “a generator tie-line transmission configuration”, where each wind farm would have its own 
dedicated grid connection infrastructure and the second is a network approach.  The author explains 
that “in a shared network transmission model, multiple OSW installations are connected to shore via 
one or more shared offshore substations and export cables (often, but not always, utilizing direct 
current [DC] technology)”.  (Brandon Burke, 2020)  Figure 4 from the white paper reflects a generator 
tie-in and various ways to work in a shared network model. 
This study investigates the two general methods 
described for grid tie-in, as well as the potential 
for taking the shared network transmission 
approach a step further, say type 3, into its own 
independent transmission system inland.  Type 
3, as discussed in an open source podcast 
discussing the white paper release, reflected a 
feasible potential to limitless bounds westward 
in its own network, however, might not reflect 
good “relationships” with existing operators.  
(Burke, 2020) 
Where the white paper states that “currently, 
there is no entity responsible for considering 
transmission needs for the overall build out of 
offshore wind on the east coast”, this study considers the potential for larger offshore wind to possibly 
serve as an independent system crossing RTO and/or ISO boundaries.  (Brandon Burke, 2020) 
One consideration that is considered by Burke et all is that the tie-in points along the coast may not be 
available to future power stations if the transmission network is developed on a first come first serve 





basis.  Where the Wind Outlook 2019 noted that the resource potential is in the vicinity of New York, 
DC, and Boston, the findings in this white paper write “Along the U.S. East Coast, OSW resources are 
located in relatively close proximity to load centers, but most OSW lease areas are distant from optimal 
points of interconnection to the existing onshore transmission networks.”  (Brandon Burke, 2020) 
This study considers that these potential “distant optimal points” are also captured by concept in 
analyzing two different case blocks for reaches beyond Hurricane zones only to the farthest reaches.  
Although it is expected that offshore wind farms in the distance future will likely remain considerably 
closer, the lesser distances would still be applicable for the purposes of this analysis.  Therefore, the 
analysis would be considering “worst case scenario” and rational break points in between. 
 
Current Type (HVAC or HVDC) 
 
The US department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability states “HVDC is a key 
technology in overcoming problems with renewable generation like wind, solar and hydro – that these 
resources are seldom located near the population centers that need them”.  (US Department of Energy, 
2017)  However, the existing US power grid is almost exclusively an HVAC network which was explained 
previously in the background section of this study.   
HVAC 
As a generator, the wind turbine produces AC currents, so if it were not for the longer distances needed 
to reach the grid an AC solution would be more effective.  However, since the offshore wind farms are 
inherently so far from grid tie-in points, the vast distance exploits the advantage that HVDC has in power 
line loss per length.  Although natural wind is “free”, the reduction of these losses still allows a higher 
percentage of the generation to reach its target and therefore making better use of initial investment, 
aka up-front costs, of each development project.  This along with all of the other percentage based 
impacts to the delivery of power generation from the turbine are called a capacity factor, a measure 
which is used to level out the competition over grid usage with other power sources.   
The HVAC solution requires a step-up transformer prior to the long transmission of power, where it then 
needs a step-down transformer prior to its functional use by the public.  Both of these transformers are 
vulnerable to geo-magnetic disturbance (GMD), which has a charging effect on the long lengths in 
between.   
Lastly, HVAC requires multiple phases.  These phases result in magnetic disturbance on marine life, and 
a slight heating effect, which are not considered within this analysis.  The more relevant factor to this 







The benefit of converting the rotational energy 
produced by each wind generator to DC current is 
in the losses of the longer run.  For this reason, 
there exists a break-even point for HVDC in terms 
of cost and length of run.  According to a study, 
the break-even distance is found to be much 
smaller for sub-sea cable systems, roughly 50 - 80 
kilometers (30 - 50 miles), than that of overhead 
systems at 400 – 700 kilometers (250 – 430 
miles).  (Albannai, 2019) 
This study does not analyze cost breaks; however, 
the break-even distance is valuable in 
determining the relevancy of measuring the use 
of HVAC solutions and assessing results.  Figure 5 
to the right represents these high-level 
assumptions.   
  
Number of Cables 
The United States power infrastructure on the East Coast is also falling vulnerable to the changing 
climate impacts, but because of atmospheric weather, flooding, and sea level change instead.  As result 
of the “war of the currents” and a history of competition over existing transmission cables, the Eastern 
United States power grid consists of a vast network of overhead lines facing capacity challenges.  A 
better planned network would have consisted of larger capacity lines and below ground solutions far 
less vulnerable to the elements and weather events.  As a result, power grid operators have valued 
extremely inefficient and costly peak power solutions in acceptance of the climate risks, as opposed to 
better quality solutions which would potentially mitigate.   
A means to address these issues is in providing redundancy in the cables, or more cables per run, which 
leaves opportunity for growth and a continuance of large portions of the power in the event of damage, 
maintenance, or other similar scenarios.  This general engineering comes at a higher cost, but also 
provides substantial resiliency to a wide array of threats.  However, when considering resilience to 
geomagnetic disturbances, more cables can potentially worsen the impact, and therefore increases the 
susceptibility to the risk. 
Noting that GMD is defined to a voltage per unit length, each additional cable for redundancy or 
necessary because of capacity, as for HVAC systems, will be subject to its own linear impact.   





A HVDC cable run may be of a variety of types, such as 
monopole (1 wire), symmetrical monopole (2 wire), bi-
polar and multi-terminal (MTDC), which is noted as the 
most used.  To simplify this design consideration for 
the purposes of this study, HVDC systems are limited to 
the maximum capacity of a single core subsea cable, as 
shown in the figure 6, as provided by ABB.  (ABB, 2006) 
 A general HVAC three phase transmission has three 
applicable wires, which are not uniformly coupled.  
These three wires are generally separated on overhead 
runs; however, a single subsea cable would require an 
insulated core to prevent the coupling of the different 
phased lines.  Since these phases are not coupled, 
these are still affected as three separate wires, as 
shown.  (ABB, 2006) 
Having three separate internal wires per run, the HVAC cable is subject to three times the influence by 
geomagnetic disturbances coupled between the atmosphere and the Earth.  This study accommodates 
this factor, however, considers that redundancy would equate out.   
In more detailed engineering analysis where redundancy would be higher, each level of redundancy 
would be a factor of three, so exponentially great.  In this consideration, larger HVAC cable systems 
above 200 kV, which require additional redundancy, are excluded because the engineering would 
require complexity beyond the intent of this study.   
All comparisons in this study are factor based, considering the three to one ratio.  In utilization of this 
study for redundancy, the analysis appropriately utilized for GMD resiliency would simply consider the 
impact as divided to each cable for larger MTDC systems providing for very large offshore wind farms of 





Geomagnetic Magnetic Disturbances (GMD), aka Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC) 
 
Regarding the longest transmission runs feasible, as mentioned previously will be of HVDC type, the 
biggest effect from natural forces will most likely be from the sun itself.   
As mentioned previously, the risk to our nation’s transmission infrastructure has become increasingly 
more visible with respect to the potential devastation which could occur as a result a geomagnetic 
storm and the piggyback risk of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).  This study will explore different gauges of 





the risk, identified by the direct force which would be applied to the network configuration for future 
Offshore Wind Farms. 
The more common geomagnetic disturbances from solar weather, as well as a GMD from a major EMP 
attack, would both typically be limited to a general location.  Solar weather influence originates in the 
poles of the Earth, with the potential to stretch closer to the equator depending on the size or how 
extreme the solar event.  An EMP attack would likely be near a city, and inland, but not have the 
capability to reach planetary reach as the case with solar weather without having much more 
devastating concerns from the nuclear explosion itself. 
The study builds on this principle by calculating the minimum touchdown points on the mainland and 
assessing how much further the operational length can feasibly be regarding threats associated with 
geomagnetic storms.  In capturing the overlay between geomagnetic storm and tropical storm threats, 
this study will provide valuable information regarding to the potential for using HVDC transmission 
during these natural weather events. 
In previous investigations, it was found that there is much larger impact from geomagnetic storms near 
the coastline and more threat to HVDC lines.  The coastal areas are reported to be as much as 20% 
greater during the same storms.  The increased threat to HVDC systems is a result of its natural longer 
system runs, but also in consideration of more cost for the conversion equipment from alternating 
currents, which Offshore Wind Energy must utilize at the generation side as well as to tie into the 
existing HVAC network of the United States.   
“During the 1989 geomagnetic storm, significant voltage fluctuations were noted in undersea cables — 
Application of modeling techniques have also been successful in validating voltage measurements on 
undersea cables”  (Metatech Corporation, 2017) 
1. Other Factors: 
• “From a protection point of view, using pipes or armored power cables will not reduce the 
coupling” (Metatech Corporation, 2017) 
• “Modeling techniques for undersea cables have been developed and have been validated 
against actual geomagnetic storms” (Metatech Corporation, 2017) 
• The largest geomagnetic storm hit, 1859 Carrington Event, was prior to the development of the 
human electrification infrastructure.  A recent “near miss” in 2012, would have been a larger 
impact, however, missed the Earth due to timing of the rotation of the sun.  Such an event may 





• “Previous calculations assumed a 
non-varying geomagnetic field 
over the entire length of the 
cable”, but “In reality an electrojet 
storm magnetic fields will vary 
over thousands of kilometers” 
(Metatech Corporation, 2017) 
• TPL-007 congressional mandate 
has pushed towards creating a 
plan and solution in a phased 
approach.  There is a strong 
consideration of “standby” 
transformers to resolve the matter, 
rather than build the infrastructure 
in a manner resilient to the impact.  This reflects “accepting” the risk, rather than mitigating it.   
• The cost of a standby transformer would be much more impactful to an offshore wind facility, 
especially one of further distance out, and the installation time would be substantially greater, 
especially during winter months.   
The impact of geomagnetic storms on the US grid will increase substantially towards the North, but 
major storms have a potential to pose a threat across the entire East Coast.  The worst-case scenario 
typically assessed by the space weather community is 4800 nT, which would have a variable impact 
stretching the entire region.  From a report in 2010, the vulnerabilities to such an event on the United 
States grid are shown in figure 7.  In the same presentation, it was noted that the highest measured 
magnetic field, in Sweden, 1921, was 20 V per km resulting from a storm approximately 5000 nT in size.   
However, in 2010 when this presentation was considering a risk comparable to the famous “Carrington 
Event” in 1859, as the Earth had not yet witnessed the near miss in 2012.  One study providing the data 
regarding the 2012 event provides data as to how big the event could have been and provide 
considerations for future planning for the purpose of this study.    
More recently, as our power sources have explored offshore opportunities, experts have been noting 
that there would be an expected coastal effect causing increase in geomagnetically induced current 
(GIC).  One study in 2018 quantified it: “Quantitative influence of coast effect on geomagnetically 
induced currents in power grids: a case study”, provides a specific value of 23% increase of influence 
along a coast, and although the case study is in China, the scenarios investigated with HVDC apply to 
physical conditions of any coast.  (Chunming Liu, 2018)   
 
Climate-Related Natural Disasters. 
 
In parallel to the effect from geomagnetic disturbances, the study explores effects from extreme climate 
related risk in the same manner of localized, regional, and national.  In this concept, a localized impact 
would be coastal effects, such as sea level change and flooding, which can cause damage to localized 
environments and may capacity factor of offshore wind farms by imposing on demand.   





A more regional effect would be a significant hurricane, which is the core weather event for this 
analysis.  An extreme hurricane event can impose on vast areas and result in major damage to 
infrastructure, as well as demand users.  This study's focus would consider the necessity to reach 
beyond hurricane zones, as to decrease the probability of impact to usage of the offshore wind farm. 
Lastly, national risks consider conceptional distances in the event of any extreme circumstance.  In the 
farthest reaches, the West Coast of California, such as the climate influence on major forest fire activity.  
A network solution that could stretch national reach with HVDC might provide potential opportunity to 
further utilize farthest reaches of offshore wind energy farms, as perhaps to be a backup plan to other 
solutions. 
 
Analysis.   
 
The analysis was performed utilizing AutoCAD Civil 3D to import maps from BOEM Madre Cadastre, DOE 
wind outlook 2019 and geomagnetic maps from NOAA.  Maps were scaled into a uniform survey 
coordinate system to assure high-level, rational accuracy of general distances for a uniform comparison 
of the various subject investigations.   
 
To determine to what extent a HVDC system is feasible for the farthest reaches of offshore wind energy 
in general, the impact from GMD was analyzed to various minimal tie in points on the shore.  As 
available in the marine Cadastre national viewer, several layers were taken into consideration while 
determining the study region for investigation.   
The “Offshore Wind Technology Depth Zone” identifies the clear areas which are already capturing 
commercial and pilot projects in existence.  “Several pilot projects have been successfully demonstrated 
in the deep water zone (60 - 900m), with foundation types including spar, semi-submersible, and 
tension leg platform designs.”  (Marine Cadastre, 2020)  However, in the purposes of this study, we 
consider that the planning effort for long term, 100 year+ risks identified for analysis would not feasibly 








BOEM maps as available on marine 
Cadastre, and professional 
recommendation were both considered to 
determine feasible marker points for 
analysis.  The farthest reaches of the map 
reflect the 200 Nautical Map boundary, 
located in red. 
Beyond this, the permit map provided 
insight of the farthest permitted area.  
Figure 8 reflects an example of potential 
impacts which would push Offshore Energy 




General sizes of subsea cables based on availability of major subsea cable providers were considered for 
feasibility in this assessment.  To reduce complexity for the purpose of a high-level investigation, 
feasible subsea cables were confirmed as available to support with the fewest cables possible, and the 
consideration of MW capacity was omitted.   
In further analysis, this study would be utilized in the engineering process while determining the 
capacity for each line, based on numerous factors considered to be outside of the scope of this analysis.   
An example of cable selection sizes is 
reflected in figure 9, noting that these cables 
available in 2009 have been significantly 
improved upon.  This array was obtained by a 
2017 study which analyzed losses in subsea 
cables supporting offshore wind farms.    
(Jayasinghe, 2017)   
Nevertheless, in this example, #5, the 450 kV 
subsea cable reflecting 600 MW on a single 
cable, would represent the most feasible use 
for resiliency to GMD for HVDC, as it does not 
require a cable pair such as #4.  Notable in 
this array is the equivalent HVAC cable, #3, 
would be limited to 50 km, and require three 
cables.    
Figure 8:  Coastal BOEM layers 





Jayasinghe’s study provided findings that there were losses and restrictions in HVAC cables which 
generally prevented use in subsea cable lengths beyond 200 kilometers.  The losses were also utilized to 
gauge break points for various bands of percentage impact on to the cable from GMD.  Figure 10, from 
the study, reflects that generally cable losses are acceptable below 3%.   
Figure 10: Cable Loss Example, HVAC vs HVDC 
 
 
Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD) and impact rating system 
 
 
The consideration for the assessment in figure 11 reflects a rating system for the impact from the 
geomagnetic storm on to the power grid system for the offshore wind power cables.  This scale is 
derived from the impact assessment based on the severity of GMD, on a scale of G-1 to G-5 being the 
most extreme, which is shown in figure 12. 
This scale is provided by 8V per kM geomagnetic storm is the planning range as identified to be the 
“benchmark”, for a 1-in-100 year GMD event, per TPL-007-1 revision as of May 15, 2017.   This GMD 
benchmark reflects the “calculated peak geoelectric field” according to the NERC standard.   
 
Inconsequential 0-3%
minor 3.1% - 10%
moderate 10.1% - 30%














The report also notes that there is an applicable factor adjustment for geomagnetic latitude, identified 
by the equation:  𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 8 ∗ 𝛼𝛼 ∗  𝛽𝛽.  Where α = factor adjustment for geomagnetic latitude and β = 
factor adjustment for regional Earth conductivity model.  (Frank Koza, 2017) 
The standard goes on to assess a “regional geoelectric field peak amplitude, Epeak, to be used in 
calculating GIC [GMD] in the GIC [GMD] system model” as a separate equation:  
 
In this equation, 17 V/km is based on a Los Alamos National Labs (LANL) report of August 2015, noting 
that this value would be used for a supplement assessment.  Together, the calculation for GMD and 
supplemental GMD, are subjected to “local enhancement” using simulations of 100 km x 100 km blocks.  
For the purposes of this study, the severe risk is left to a consistent 17 V per kilometer.   
These factors for GMD impact consider only inland threat, the report provides no offset for a near 
coastline factor, as mentioned previously in background research supporting this study.  The coastal 
GMD effect is a 1.2 multiplier.  (Metatech Corporation, 2017)  This study assumes this potential 
phenomenon would only apply to GMD from major solar weather events, as the ground coupling would 
likely require regions too vast for a rational size EMP.  Therefore, to account for this factor, this study 
limits the 1.2 multiplier to the severe benchmark analysis, capturing this as the general design risk for 
severe category, expectedly a G-4 category event.   
The buried subsea cables may be several feet to meters deep, which may provide some degree of 
resistance to a HEMP or EMP attack, however, has no measurable effect on GMD resulting from 
atmosphere to Earth coupling from a major solar weather event.  (Metatech Corporation, 2017) 
To match TPL-007-1, this analysis also assumes a 60-degree North latitude reference location for 
calculations, therefore maintaining 8 Volts per kilometer as a “calculated peak geoelectric field”.  (Frank 
Koza, 2017) 





Furthermore, as found in the background study, experts contested the benchmark analysis produced in 
the report, stating that the potential threat was substantially undermined.  Noting that “if the 
Benchmark GMD Event were to be set at the maximum threat level that had been estimated by the 
respected space weather scientists previously engaged in the NERC standard-setting process (30-40 
volts/kilometer)” (Thomas Popik, 2017) this study assumes that an extreme condition, referenced as a 
G5 event or greater on the scale, reflects a value of up to 40 V per kilometer.  This study accepts the 
feasibility that up to 40 V per kilometer may be feasible as a worst possible case scenario under all 
circumstances, and assumes factors discussed previously have been accounted for.   
 
The calculation was carried out further to add the necessary means to consider what is needed to 
extend past the tropical zones as captured in the BOEM layer, to see the minimum range needed to truly 
avoid initial natural weather impacts on the East coast.  A last calculation extends the full potential of 
the HVDC lengths, in the consideration that it would be useful at all up to 85% capacity of the voltage 
rating.  These two calculations intended to consider the extents of grid tie-in capability during a 
geomagnetic storm event, potentially supplementing other power types which may be less responsive 
to rapid ramping as offshore Wind.   
 
Climate Related Impacts. 
 
As the final part of this analysis, the mapping systems were utilized to find the potential reach for cable 
systems that are rationally resilient to GMD risk.  For the purposes of climate-related risk, the BOEM 
layer of tropical cyclones in the North Atlantic was utilized, to determine how far west the probability 
impact stretched in terms of the length of additional cable length.   
To accomplish this, two hurricane zones were determined, one at 250 NM and the other at 500 NM, to 
provide high-level analysis of the hurricane reach based on a potential grid point tie-in location, as 
discussed previously.   
The map layer utilized clearly sets 
probability zones, declining as they 
stretch West into the continent.  The 
concept in this analysis is to break 
the higher probability zones.  The 
first zone, notable as the light 
shades of orange encapsulating 
Washington DC, is assumed 
reachable within the 250 NM mark, 
or a cable length, with a 15% error, 
of 287 miles (523 kilometers).   
The vast area in the second to 
lightest region is considered past the 
probability associated with 
hurricane risk, obtainable with a 
reach of a cable length longer than 





1000 kilometers.  From the coastline, 500 NM generally reaches the center of the probability area, 
which accounts for over 50 kilometers out to sea.  To avoid complexity, these assumptions do not 
account for increase in hurricane severity as offshore wind energy farms are potentially pushed further 




The analysis yielded the following data.   
8 Volts per kilometer 
 
20 Volts per kilometer 
 
 










































# occurences Tropical 
Cyclone (117 year)
Current Installations 25 46 29 53 426 3.9% 1.3% 1.0% 0.3% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 60 to 80
Break-even AC/DC 50 93 57 106 851 7.7% 2.6% 1.9% 0.6% 1.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 60 to 80
HVDC significant 75 139 86 160 1277 11.6% 3.9% 2.9% 1.0% 1.9% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 60 to 80
Farthest Permit US 100 185 115 213 1702 15.5% 5.2% 3.9% 1.3% 2.6% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 40 to 80
Farthest Permit IEA Outlook 200 370 229 426 3404 30.9% 10.3% 7.7% 2.6% 5.1% 1.7% 0.9% 0.6% 20 to 80
Hurricane zone 1 250 463 287 532 4255 38.7% 12.9% 9.7% 3.2% 6.4% 2.1% 1.1% 0.8% 20 to 40






































# occurences Tropical 
Cyclone (117 year)
Current Installations 25 46 29 53 1064 9.7% 3.2% 2.4% 0.8% 1.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 60 to 80
Break-even AC/DC 50 93 57 106 2128 19.3% 6.4% 4.8% 1.6% 3.2% 1.1% 0.5% 0.4% 60 to 80
HVDC significant 75 139 86 160 3191 29.0% 9.7% 7.3% 2.4% 4.8% 1.6% 0.8% 0.6% 60 to 80
Farthest Permit US 100 185 115 213 4255 38.7% 12.9% 9.7% 3.2% 6.4% 2.1% 1.1% 0.8% 40 to 80
Farthest Permit IEA Outlook 200 370 229 426 8510 77.4% 25.8% 19.3% 6.4% 12.8% 4.3% 2.1% 1.6% 20 to 80
Hurricane zone 1 250 463 287 532 10638 96.7% 32.2% 24.2% 8.1% 16.0% 5.3% 2.7% 2.0% 20 to 40






































# occurences Tropical 
Cyclone (117 year)
Current Installations 25 46 29 53 2128 19.3% 6.4% 4.8% 1.6% 3.2% 1.1% 0.5% 0.4% 60 to 80
Break-even AC/DC 50 93 57 106 4255 38.7% 12.9% 9.7% 3.2% 6.4% 2.1% 1.1% 0.8% 60 to 80
HVDC significant 75 139 86 160 6383 58.0% 19.3% 14.5% 4.8% 9.6% 3.2% 1.6% 1.2% 60 to 80
Farthest Permit US 100 185 115 213 8510 77.4% 25.8% 19.3% 6.4% 12.8% 4.3% 2.1% 1.6% 40 to 80
Farthest Permit IEA Outlook 200 370 229 426 17020 154.7% 51.6% 38.7% 12.9% 25.5% 8.5% 4.3% 3.2% 20 to 80
Hurricane zone 1 250 463 287 532 21275 193.4% 64.5% 48.4% 16.1% 31.9% 10.6% 5.3% 4.1% 20 to 40







In assessment of this data, findings suggest that the closest offshore wind farms will have low risks 
associated with GMD, unless HVAC cables are utilized beyond 50 nautical miles.  Although use of the 
HVAC cables for the longer runs is extremely unlikely due to loss and break-even analysis point, doing so 
would pose significant risk to the transmission cables in all scenarios.  This reflects a potential result in 
costs associated with replacement and may require back up transformers to comply with policies 
discussed previously. 
The 8 volts per kilometer as found to be relative in the TPS-007-1 standard results reflect very low risk, 
represented by inconsequential, “green” zones almost exclusively where cable size and types would be 
used.  Where not inconsequential, GMD would easily be managed by functionality of the wind turbine 
and smart controls.  This reflects that the standard provides a perception that the threat is non-existent 
to offshore wind energy, and probably remains to be the case for most frequent solar weather events 
and an EMP attack.   
In these green areas, HVDC and HVAC cable types could feasibly add multiple cables for redundancy and 
remain within tolerances to easily manage GMD or simply engineer for it within design safety factors.  
The severe impact of a major solar weather event could feasibly reach the 20 Volt per kilometer 
threshold, which reflects potential outage and trip risks in certain configurations to be worried of. HVAC 
cables, especially in higher voltages, and should probably be avoided for use in cable lengths longer than 
400 kilometers.  Beyond 200 kilometers, adding the cable redundancy likely necessary could yield 
potential issues.       
The extreme scenario, of 40 volts per kilometer, no longer has inconsequential scenarios while utilizing 
HVAC cables.  While utilizing shorter runs using 33 kV systems, the HVAC impact is rather high, signaling 
that if to be used, mitigation measures for GMD will be necessary.  The length and configuration of 
these runs could also apply to subsea cables between the wind turbine and the substations out at sea.   
The results of this study suggest that using 132 kV lines regardless of the MW capacity and sizing could 
resolve the GMD risk for smaller offshore wind farms close to the coast, within 25 NM.  This solution 
might be more cost effective than having to provide upfront costs for a redundant transformer.  When 
utilizing HVDC, 200kV and larger cables avoid the risks associated with GMD up to 100 NM, which covers 
the farthest permitted US project to date.   
Furthermore, to reach beyond 50 occurrences in the 117-year period, for tropical storm events, 
signaling safer zones, the cable lengths would likely need to be more than 200 kilometers.  That would 
consider cable lengths of the 100 NM mark and longer.   
The 132 kV and 200 kV size cables could feasibly handle the shorter distances to reach to the lower 
probability hurricane zones.  However, to reach the farthest reaches with redundancy, at 500-kilometer 
lengths and longer, GMD mitigation will not be avoided.  The newest capacity lines, at 525 kV, have the 
capability to provide resiliency with minor concern of GMD beyond 1000 kilometers, which has the 







The findings in this study reflect several potential “partnerships” for future offshore wind farm 
developments, where there are clear mutual benefits in the construction of extended length HVDC 
systems.  When utilizing larger transmission capability, HVDC cable systems can mitigate the risks of 
geomagnetic storms and climate related risks at the same time.  This reflects potential areas for 
investment, as the benefit can reach vastly across the United States as a solution to other costly issues.  
The study also points out a few vulnerabilities that will exist without future planning outlook.  As lengths 
get longer, transmission capacity for future offshore wind farms can reflect on “lessons learned” from 
the development history of the HVAC transmission network in the US.  Early Offshore Wind farms might 
not be impacted by geomagnetic disturbances, but with a short distance added either to the East or 
West, these systems will quickly become susceptible to the risk.   
To manage against the risk of geomagnetic storms, utilizing larger transmission cable systems will be an 
important consideration during the early planning phase.  Since these might not be beneficial to smaller 
or individual projects, a master planning effort would be useful to protect end users from unpredictable 






(NOAA) NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION. (n.d.). SPACE WEATHER IMPACTS 
ON CLIMATE. Retrieved from Space Weather Prediction Center: 
https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/impacts/space-weather-impacts-climate 
4C Offshore. (2020). Subsea Cable & Pipeline. Retrieved from 4coffshore.com: 
https://www.4coffshore.com/consultancy/subsea-cable-installations.aspx 
A. Kalair, N. A. (2016). Comparative study of HVAC and HVDC transmission systems. Comsats Instituate 
of Information Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering. Pakistan: Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews. doi:10.1016 
ABB. (2006). HVDC Light Cables. Retrieved from 
https://library.e.abb.com/public/564b3711c060164dc1257b0c00552e50/HVDC%20Light%20po
wer%20cables.pdf 
Albannai, B. (2019). Comparative Study of HVAC and HVDC Transmission Systems With Proposed 
Machine Learning Algorithms for Fault Location Detection.  
BOEM. (2020). The Reorganization Of The Former MMS. Retrieved from About BOEM: 
https://www.boem.gov/about-boem/reorganization/reorganization-former-mms 
Brandon Burke, M. G. (2020). Offshore Wind Transmission White Paper. Baltimre, Maryland: The 
Business Network for Offshore Wind. 
Burke, B. (2020). Fara Courtney (Outer Harbor Consulting), Rob Gramlich & Michael Goggin [Recorded 
by OSW Insider]. Podcast Episode October 26. 
Business Network For Offshore Wind. (2020). Home Page. Retrieved from Business Network for Offshore 
Wind's Offshore Wind Supply Chain Connect: https://www.offshorewindus.org/ 
Center for Integrative Environmental Research (CIER). (2010). Maryland offshore Wind Development:. 
University of Maryland. 
Chunming Liu, X. W. (2018). Quantitative influence of coast effect on geomagnetically induced. J. Space 
Weather Space Clim. doi:https://doi.org/10.1051/swsc/2018046 
(2018). Electromagnetic Field Effects on Marine Fishes in the Mid-Atlantic. Virginia Department of 
Environmental Quality. Retrieved from 
https://www.deq.virginia.gov/Portals/0/DEQ/CoastalZoneManagement/FundsInitiativesProjects
/task94-01-16b.pdf 
Equinor. (2020). The Future of Wind is afloat. Retrieved from What We Do: 
https://www.equinor.com/en/what-we-do/floating-wind.html 
Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses, EXECUTIVE ORDER 







Frank Koza, P. I. (2017). TPL-007 Revisions NERC Standards Project 2013-03 GMD Mitigation. NERC 
(North American Reliability Corporation). Retrieved from 
https://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%
202013/TPL-007_Revisions_may_15_2017.pdf 
IEA. (2019). World Energy Outlook. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-
2019# 
Jayasinghe, K. (2017). POWER LOSS EVALUATION OF SUBMARINE CABLES IN 500MW OFFSHORE WIND 
FARM. Uppsala University, Department of Earth Sciences, Campus Gotland. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/project/Power-Loss-Evaluation-in-Submarine-Cables-in-offshore-
wind-farms 
Jones, J. (2019, June 1). 10 Largest Hurricanes Ever Recorded. Retrieved from Largest.org: 
https://largest.org/nature/hurricanes/ 
Lesser, J. (2014, October 29). America’s Electricity Grid: Outdated or Underrated? Retrieved from The 
Heritage Foundation: https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/americas-electricity-grid-
outdated-or-underrated 
Marine Cadastre. (2020). Marine Cadastre National Viewer. Retrieved from 
https://www.marinecadastre.gov/ 
Metatech Corporation. (2017). Impact of Severe Geomagnetic Storms on Submarine Cables. Honolulu, 
Hawaii: Metatech. Retrieved from 
https://online.ptc.org/assets/uploads/papers/ptc17/PTC17_Tue_RTS8_Radasky.pdf 
NASA. (2014, July). Near Miss: The Solar Superstorm of July 2012. Retrieved from NASA Science News: 
https://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2014/23jul_superstorm/ 
NASA. (2019, September 6). What Is the Sun's Role in Climate Change? Retrieved from Global Climate 
Change Website: https://climate.nasa.gov/blog/2910/what-is-the-suns-role-in-climate-change/ 
NASA Global Climate Change. (2020, February). There Is No Impending 'Mini Ice Age'. Global Climate 
Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. Retrieved from https://climate.nasa.gov/blog/2953/there-is-
no-impending-mini-ice-age/ 
Nexans. (2018, November 30). Nexans successfully qualifies a 525 kV HVDC underground cable system to 
German TSO standards . Retrieved from Nexans: 
https://www.nexans.com/newsroom/news/details/2018/11/Nexans-successfully-qualifies-a-
525-kV-HVDC-underground-cable-system-to-German-TSO-standards.html 
Nix, E. (2019, October 24). How Edison, Tesla and Westinghouse Battled to Electrify America. Retrieved 
from https://www.history.com/news/what-was-the-war-of-the-currents 







Office of the Press Secretary. (2015, September 28). FACT SHEET: White House Summit on Offshore 
Wind. Washington, DC: The White House. Retrieved from 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/fact-sheet-white-house-
summit-offshore-wind 
Perez, M. e. (2020, October). Breakthrough in directional drilling. World Oil, 241(10). Retrieved from 
https://www.worldoil.com/magazine/2020/october-2020/special-focus/breakthrough-in-
directional-drilling 
Raymundo Enrique Torres Olguin, A. G. (2014). HVDC Transmission for Offshore Wind Farms. Green 
Energy and Technology. doi:10.1007/978-981-4585-30-9_11 
Thomas Popik, G. B. (2017). Electric Reliability Standards for Solar Geomagnetic Disturbances . 
Foundation for Resilient Societies, Inc. Dr. William Graham. 
US Department of Energy. (2017, May). Cyber Attack Resilient High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) 
Systems. Retrieved from Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability: 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/06/f34/ABB_HVDC_FactSheet.pdf 
X. Xiang, M. M. (2016). Cost Analysis and Comparison of HVAC, LFAC and HVDC for Offshore Wind Power 
Connection. London, UK: Imperial College London. doi:10.1049/cp.2016.0386 
Yergin, D. (2020). A New Map. Penguin Audio. 
 
 
 
